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Wednesday, July 31, 2013

Legal Intern - GOOGLE-Kenya

 


Google's legal department is at the center of an information law revolution, and you're at its core. As a Legal Assistant, you are a driving force behind the success of your Legal team, ready to roll up your sleeves to create and improve processes, maintain records, conduct legal research and coordinate communications across the team. As you closely support your team, you may find yourself working with multiple groups within the Legal Department, internal clients across Google, and external parties. You're an independent thinker who isn't afraid to ask questions, and you're organized in a way that never overlooks the details.

As a Legal Intern with a specialization in intellectual property, technology or media law, you will contribute to the legal team’s efforts in a variety of areas including commercial agreements, marketing projects as well as dispute resolution and litigation. Candidates should be capable of producing high-quality legal research and analysis work in a flexible, fast-paced environment and have the ability to work in English, orally and in writing.

Responsibilities

  • Conduct cross jurisdiction legal research on a wide variety of legal topics including: intellectual property, consumer regulations, media law, advertising law, etc.
  • Draft and/or localise commercial agreements.
  • Respond to various legal requests from users and third parties in relation to Google services.
  • Assist the legal team in the preparation and the management of court actions.
  • Participate in the creation of an internal knowledge base for the legal team.
  • Minimum qualifications
  • Degree (LL.B. or equivalent). In lieu of degree, relevant skills or equivalent experience.
  • Recent graduate (12 months or less since graduation).
  • Preferred qualifications
  • Excellent legal analysis and research skills.
  • Excellent knowledge of online technologies and Google services.
  • Hard working, well organised and able to manage numerous projects simultaneously under deadline pressure.
  • Excellent written and oral skills in English. French would be an added advantage.

Appelate Brief-Death Penalty in Kenya


 

 

THE SUPREME COURT OF KENYA

AN APPEAL AGAINST THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL

AT NAIROBI

BETWEEN

THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA……………………………………………………………….……………………………………………………………APPELLANT

AND

CHARO KADENEGE MWAVIRO alias ‘ZIPAPA’………………………………………………………...………………….……..RESPONDENT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Counsel for the Republic

Miss Kiama Catherine 


 

Contents

Table of Authorities……………………………………………………………………………….3

Question presented………………………………………………………………………………...5

Rules of evidence involved……………………………………………………………….……….6

Standard of review……………………………………………………………..………………….7

Statement of the case…………………………………………………………...…………………7

Summary of argument……………………………………………………………………………..9

Main arguments

a.       The Court of Appeal erred in finding that Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya is inconsistent with and contrary to Articles 24 (1); 24 (2) (c) and 26 (1) (3) of the Constitution of Kenya…………………………………………………………12

b.      The Court of Appeal erred in finding that  Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya is inconsistent with and contrary to Articles 29 (f) and 25 (a) (c) of the Constitution of Kenya and Articles 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights…………………………………………………………………………………….17

c.       The Court of Appeal erred in finding that  Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya is inconsistent with and contrary to Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights…………………………………………………..22

d.      The Court of Appeal erred in finding that  Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya is inconsistent with and contrary to Article 28 of the Constitution……..24

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………...26

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Constitutions

(i)     The Kenyan Constitution  of 2010

(ii)   The Zimbabwean  Constitution of 1979

(iii) The Nigerian Constitution of 1979

(iv) The Ugandan Constitution of 1995

(v)   The South African Constitution of 1996

(vi) The Indian Constitution of 1950

Kenyan Case

(i)     Chemagong v. R[1984] KLR 611.

(ii)   David Njoroge Macharia -v- Republic Criminal  Appeal No. 497 of 2007[2011] eKLR

(iii) John Swaka v The Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others[2013] eKLR Constitutional Petition 318 of 2011  

(iv) Re The Matter of Zipporah Wambui Mathara [2010] eKLR

Regional Case

(i)     Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe vs. Attorney General and Others1993) 2LRC 279

(ii)   Kalu vs. the State (1998) 13 NIUL R54

(iii) Republic v Mbushuu and another 3 1995 TLR 97

(iv)  Susan Kigula & 416 others Constitutional Petition No 6 of 2003

(v)    The State versus T Makwanyane and M Mchunu Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Africa (1995) ILRC 269 Cct/3/94

Cases from other jurisdictions  

(i)     Bacan Singh vs. State of Punjab (1983) (2) SCR 583

(ii)   Earl Pratt and Anor vs. Attorney General for Jamaica and Another (1994)2 ACI (PC)

(iii) Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972)

(iv)  Jaga vs. Donges No 1950 USA 653

(v)    Noel Riley and other vs. Attorney General for Jamaica and Anor (191983)1 AC 719(PC)

(vi)  Pratt and Morgan vs. Attorney General of Jamaica and others(case No 27 vol 3) No 210 of 1986 and 225 of 1987

Statutes

(i)     Civil Procedure Act, Chapter 21, Laws of Kenya

(ii)   Judicature Act ,Chapter 8, Laws of Kenya

(iii) Penal Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya


QUESTION PRESENTED

a.       Whether Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya is inconsistent with and contrary to Articles 24 (1); 24 (2) (c) and 26 (1) (3) of the Constitution of Kenya.

b.      Whether Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya is inconsistent with and contrary to Articles 29 (f) and 25 (a) (c) of the Constitution of Kenya and Articles 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[1].

c.       Whether Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya is inconsistent with and contrary to Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[2].

d.      Whether Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya is inconsistent with and contrary to Article 28 of the Constitution.


 

RULE OF EVIDENCE INVOLVED

The Criminal Procedure Act Section 72 (1) (a) (b) (c)[3] provides:

(1)   ‘[E]xcept where otherwise expressly provided in this Act or by any other law for the time being in force ,an appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal[4] from every decree passed in appeal by the High Court ,on any of the following grounds, namely:

(a)    The decision being contrary to law or to some usage having the force of the law;

(b)   The decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law;

(c)    A substantial error or defect in the procedure of this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits.’

The impetus of these provisos are  to the effect that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the grounds of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error may seem to be[5]. The appellate court will not normally interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the two courts below unless such findings are based on no evidence, or are based on a misapprehension of the evidence, or the courts below are shown demonstrably to have acted on wrong principles in making the findings  as laid down as a general principle in the case of Chemagong v. R[6] Section 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act mandates the appellate court, subject to any limitations and conditions as may be prescribed by the Rules, to exercise its appellate jurisdiction in one or more of the following ways;

(a)    ‘[d]etermine the case finally having regard to the grounds upon which the appeal is preferred’...[7]

The Penal Code Section 297[8] provides:

(2)   ‘[I]f the offender is armed with any dangerous or offensive weapon or instrument, or is in company with one or more other person or persons, or if, at or immediately before or immediately after the time of the assault, he wounds, beats, strikes or uses any other personal violence to any person, he shall be sentenced to death..’

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Offences of murder, treason and robbery with violence, including attempted robbery with violence, carry a mandatory death sentence in Kenya. This is provided for under Sections 204, 40 (3), 296 (2) and 297 (2) of the Penal Code[9]. Whereas the Constitution of Kenya protects the right to life, Article   26 (3) takes it away to the effect that ‘[n]o person shall be deprived of his life intentionally except to the extent authorisied by this Constitution or other written law.’

The appellate court will review the Constitutionality of the death penalty in light of the current Constitution viz-a-viz other Regional and International instruments which Kenya is party to. The scope of this review is limited to Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code[10] of Kenya.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On or around the night of the 24th December 2008 at around 7:30 pm, Mr Charo Kadenge Mwaviro alias ‘Zipapa’ in the company of another raided the complainant’s; Mama Rosa Okumbe Mlang’ombe’s hardware shop at Garsen Market of Tana River County with an intention

to steal. The accused person proceeded to search the cash till and threatened to kill the complainant if she failed to comply, or if she attempted to raise an alarm.

In the process of the altercation, the complaint sustained head injuries and the court concluded that her injury and subsequent loss of consciousness resulted from the direct attack by either of the perpetrators. The Respondent herein was arrested but his companion however escaped and was still on the run at the end of the trial in the lower court.

Upon completion of the trial, the trial court by a majority of two to one, found the Respondent guilty as charged and reserved mitigation plea and sentencing for a later date. The Respondent in the mean time filed an application before the High Court under Article 165 (3) (b) (d) (i) (ii) of the Constitution[11] challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty facing him following conviction. The Respondent further sought an interpretation of the Constitution arguing that the mandatory death penalty as prescribed by the Penal Code[12] is at a variance with the Constitutional and International law. The Court of Appeal unanimously reversed the decision of the High Court. The State Appeals the decision to the Supreme Court under Article 163 (b) (i)[13] and Article 163 (4) (a)[14] of the Constitution.


SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.

The right to life, under the Kenyan Constitution and as a general principle of human rights is inherent and universal and yet also subject to the possibility of lawful deprivation. Thus, that means there can be instances in which the due process of law will deny a person his right to life or his protection if sanctioned by written law or the Constitution. This is explicitly provided for under Article 26 (3) of the Constitution[15] which limits the very fundamental right to life concluding that the right is not an absolute right but rather a qualified right.

Article 2 (1) of the Constitution states that ‘[t]his Constitution is supreme law of the Republic and binds all State organs at both levels of government.’ Further Article 2 (4) provides that ‘[a]ny law, including customary law that is inconsistent with this Constitution is void to the extent of the inconsistency, and any act or omission in contravention of this Constitution is invalid.’

The Judicature Act , Section 3[16] offers a hierarchy of sources of laws in Kenya but does not mention International law, the same has however been reconciled   by Articles 2 (5) and (6) of the Constitution which recognizes that general rules of  international law and ratified treaties or convention as forming  part of the law of Kenya.

In general, Kenya has a strong record of ratifying major International and Regional Human Rights Instruments. In particular, Kenya has shown its commitment by accenting to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[17] on May 1st 1972. Kenya also became party to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights as of January 23rd 1992.It is prudent to note that Kenya abstained from signing and ratifying the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Recognizing Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Committee and the Second Optional Protocol[18] to the ICCPR, Toward the Abolition of the Death Penalty[19].

Under the previous constitutional regime, Kenya adhered to a dualist legal system and as such international treaties and obligations did not take immediate effect and required implementation through domestic legislation. The result was that as such, the full implementation of a number of treaties and convention ratified could only be realized once national legislation was passed to effectuate the same. It appears that there has been a shift toward a monist system as provided for under Article 2(5) and 2 (6) of the new Kenyan Constitution. As a consequence therefore it seems that international law need not be domesticated and as a result it seems to appear that international law may now have automatic effect in domestic law presently. In Re The Matter of Zipporah Wambui Mathara[20] the superior court held that by virtue of the provisions of Section 2 (6) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, International Treaties, and Conventions that Kenya has ratified, were imported as part of the sources of the Kenyan Law and thus the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which Kenya ratified were held to be part of the Kenyan law.

The Constitution boasts of it supremacy , presently is clear and unambiguous; it does not expressly ban the death penalty. It is supreme to any other law and most conspicuously is the draft’s man  deliberate inclusion of the limitation to the right to life as provided for under Article 26 (3) which could lead to adverse conclusions being drawn  to the effect that Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code is in fact constitutional and therefore valid to the extent prescribed by any other written law and the Constitution.


MAIN ARGUMENTS.

a.       The Court of Appeal erred in finding that Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya is inconsistent with and contrary to Articles 24 (1); 24 (2) (c) and 26 (1) (3) of the Constitution of Kenya.

Article 24 (1) is to the effect that ‘[a]right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not be limited except by law and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom taking into account relevant factors, including-

(a)    The nature of the right or fundamental freedom;

(b)   The importance of the purpose of limitation;

(c)    The nature and extent of the limitation;

(d)   The need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does no prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and

(e)    The relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.’

The purpose of the Criminal justice system is to firstly punish the offender for the offence committed. Secondly, an effective system aims to protect members of the general public from eminent danger posed by the criminal whilst striving   to rehabilitate the offender for assimilation back into society after succefuly serving their time. The criminal justice system further endeavors to deter members of the society from engaging in anti-social behavior and consequently does so by using offenders as examples of what may befall others who commit such offences. It could be argued that the system is also used as a means to obtain revenge though clothed and backed up by legal sanction.

Article 24 provides for the limitation of rights and fundamental freedoms as enshrined by the Constitution. This proviso recognizes that some rights are subject to limitation through law in this particular appeal through the Penal Code. Section 297 (2)[21] states that ‘[I]f the offender is armed with any dangerous or offensive weapon or instrument, or is in company with one or more other person or persons, or if, at or immediately before or immediately after the time of the assault, he wounds, beats, strikes or uses any other personal violence to any person, he shall be sentenced to death.’ It is imperative to note that the limitation to the right to life is only legitimate for the offences of murder, treason and robbery with violence, including attempted robbery with violence, which all carry a mandatory death sentence in Kenya. It could be viewed from the onset that the nature of the offences which result in capital punishment are aggravated offences in nature. It therefore could be argued that the limitation to the right to life as provided for in Article 26 is reasonable given the gravity of the offences as mentioned which carry the death penalty. It could be further demonstrated that the application of this limitation is not arbitrary and as such is justifiable. The Kenyan Constitution is relatively new and is in fact   three years shy. The Kenyan people had a unique opportunity to expressly condemn and abolish the death penalty if they so wished, failure to do so demonstrates that the Kenyan people regard the death penalty as an acceptable form of punishment. Further inference could also be drawn from the direct failure of the Kenyan people to be party to the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Recognizing Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Committee and the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Toward the Abolition of the Death Penalty.

Article 25 of the Constitution lists the rights and freedoms   that may not be limited despite any other provision as provided in the Constitution and in any other law. These include: 

(a) ‘the freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;

(b) freedom from slavery or servitude;

(c) the right to a fair trial; and

(d) the right to an order of habeas corpus’.

conspicuously missing from this list is the right to life protected under Article 26(1) and the right to human dignity as guaranteed by Article 28 of the Constitution. The suggestion given is that the freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, freedom from slavery and the right to a fair trial ; and to produce the body are the only truly absolute rights in Kenya. This further buttresses the notion that the right to life may be limited by law as demonstrated by Section 297(2) of the Penal code. This provision seems compatible and consistent  in light of Article 24 (2) (c) as can be acquiescent by the later proviso in Article 25 of the Constitution. Article 26 (1) (3)  states that ‘[e]very person has the right to life,’ and  ‘[a]person shall not be deprived of life intentionally, except to the extent authorized by this Constitution or other written law.’ It seems plausible to conclude that as long as the capital punishment as provided under various sections of the Penal Code are not amended or repealed; the right to life may be legally deprived and still retains consistency with the Constitution.

In the instant case, the court is faced with the task of interpreting one constitutional provision against another, namely   the limitation of rights and fundamental freedoms as against the right to life. There is a well known rule of interpretation that to take away a right given by a statute, the legislature must do so in clear terms devoid of any ambiguity. The right to life is not a super Article. The South African case of State vs. Makwanyane & Anor (1995) ILRC 269 is not a relevant authority to the instant case because under the South African Constitution, the right to life is unqualified. Under the Kenyan Constitution on the other hand, the right to life is qualified as provided for in Article 26 (3). The Death penalty is, therefore, validated as an exception to Article 26 and as such remains constitutional.

The relevant authority to be relied on is the Nigerian decision in Kalu vs. the State (1998)[22] because the constitutional provisions it considered are in pari materia with our Articles 24 and 26 (3) of our Constitution. Section 30(1) of the Nigerian Constitution provides:-

“Every person has a right to life and no one shall be deprived intentionally of his life save in execution of a sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been found guilty in Nigeria.”

That provision is in pari materia with our Article 26 (3) which provide that:-

‘[a]person shall not be deprived of life intentionally, except to the extent authorized by this Constitution or other written law.’ It is clear from the above provisions that the right to life under the Nigerian Constitution, as our  own, is qualified. The Supreme Court of Nigeria had no difficulty finding that the death penalty which is expressly recognized in Section 30(1) of their Constitution is constitutional. If the legislature had intended not to limit the very right it recognized in Article 26 (1) by Article 26 (3) and having freshly in its mind Article 25, it would have endeavored to so in clear terms. It is my humble submission therefore that this court be persuaded by the force and logic of a similar court of its stature and find that Section 297 (2) is consistent with Article 24 (1), (2) (c) and 26 (1) (3) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of Nigeria followed the Jamaican decisions in Noel Riley and other vs. Attorney General for Jamaica and Anor (191983)1 AC 719(PC). Earl Pratt and Anor vs. Attorney General for Jamaica and Another (1994)2 ACI (PC).

Persuasive authorities also to be considered is light of the same is that of the Bacan Singh vs. State of Punjab (1983) (2) SCR 583 where Article 21 of the Indian Constitution which is similar to our Article 26 (3) was considered and the Supreme Court of India held that the right to life under the Indian Constitution was qualified. In all those circumstances cited, the death penalty was held to be constitutionally valid.

 


 

b.      The Court of Appeal erred in finding that  Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya is inconsistent with and contrary to Articles 29 (f) and 25 (a) (c) of the Constitution of Kenya and Articles 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Article 29 (f) is to the effect that ‘[e]very person  has the right to freedom and security of the person which includes among others the right not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading manner.’ Article 25 (a) (c) on the other hand  reaffirms the importance of the right  to a fair trial and expressly stipulates that it is a right that  cannot be derogated from under the Constitution. Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that; ‘[N]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.’

The term ‘torture’ was defined by the United Nations General Assembly in its unanimously adopted ‘Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from being subjected to Torture and other cruel, inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ of 9 December 1975[23] .‘Torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such purpose as obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or intimidating him or other persons. Notably it does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or accidental to, lawful sanctions’. The court in the decided decision of Republic v Mbushuu and another[24]  found that any physical or severe mental pain or suffering brought about by the death penalty, does not constitute torture. Learned judges in the Supreme Court decision in the case of Furman v. Georgia, note: ‘Brennan, J said at 367 that the State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings.  He warned that members of the human race should not be treated as non-humans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded.’ It could be argued that if indeed Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code is found to constitute cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment, it is still licit because capital punishment falls within the scope of constitutionally permissible limitations of the right as provided for under Article 26 (3) and impliedly by omission of non-derogatable rights and freedoms as provided for by Article 25 of the Constitution.

It was stated in Jaga vs. Donges No 1950 USA 653, ‘The often repeated statement that words and expressions used in a statute must be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning; is the statement that they must be interpreted in the light of their context. (emphasis added).

It is clear from the above passage that the words in Article 29 (f) must be given their plain meaning and   interpreted in the context of the Constitution in which they are used, but not in abstract. The same should be held in the backdrop of the intention of the Kenyan people, the spirit of the Constitution and the very essence of punishing offenders under the  criminal justice system. It would be almost certain to assume that for any effective punishment, some form of pain, displeasure  and discomfort must be present for it to be considered effective.

Article 26 (3) recognizes the  death penalty in execution of a sentence passed in a fair trial by a court of competent jurisdiction in respect of a criminal offence under the laws of Kenya  and the conviction and sentence as having  been confirmed by the highest appellate court in Kenya . This is an exception to the enjoyment to the right to life. To that extent the death penalty is constitutional. Article 29 outlaws any form of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The imposing question to answer is whether the framers of our Constitution intended to take away, by Article 26 (3), the right they recognized in Article 25 and Article 29 (f).

In The State versus T Makwanyane and M Mchunu[25]the Constitutional Court of South Africa found the death penalty to be inherently cruel, inhuman or degrading and, therefore, unconstitutional. It is sagacious to point that this is a logical consequence given that the right to life under the Constitution of South Africa is unqualified. This case  could be distinguished from the Kenyan Constitution which qualifies the right to life as discussed in detail above. This could subsequently mean  that  the death penalty cannot be viewed as  being inherently cruel, inhuman or degrading  and as such Section 297 (2) is proved to be consistent with Article 29 (f) and 25 (a) (c).

In the alternative and in the unlikely event that this court finds that the death penalty is inherently cruel and contrary to Article 29 (f) and 25 (a) (c), I pray that the court takes note of Mbushu and Anor versus the Republic (1995)[26].In this case the Court of Appeal of Tanzania, found that the death penalty is inherently cruel, inhuman and/or degrading but declined to declare it unconstitutional. Their reason was that it was saved by Article 30(2) of their Constitution. The right to life under the Tanzanian Constitution is appears as our own, as being a qualified right. It is my humble submission thus that the Court finds that Section 297 (2) is consistent with Article 29 (f) and 25 (a) (c).In the alternative, that the Court finds that Section 297 (2) is saved by Article 26 (3) of the Constitution.

Article 50 (6) of the Constitution offers further protection and safe guards to convicted felons. The provision gives a convict the right to petition the High Court for a new trial even after his appeal has been dismissed by the highest court to which an appeal lies. This article can be seen to further the overriding objective of the civil procedure rules and offers a continued right to  a fair hearing as provided for by Article 50 (1). The requirement of confirmation of conviction and sentence shows that both conviction and sentence are opened to automatic review on appeal. This further proves the states intent and commitment to uphold Article 25 (a) (c) of the Constitution. Following the recent decision of the High Court petition in Nairobi in the case of John Swaka v The Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others[27] Mumbi Ngugi, J, and D S Majanja, J, held that the requirement for legal representation under Article 50(2) (h) of the Constitution is subject to the provisions of Article 261(1) which provides for the enactment of legislation to govern a particular matter within the period specified in the Fifth Schedule. The Fifth Schedule provides that legislation on fair hearing is to be enacted within four years from the effective date; that consequently, there is currently no statutory or constitutional duty imposed on the appellant herein  to provide legal representation for persons facing capital charges. It should also be pointed out that the new Constitution does not apply retrospectively. The Respondent was first tried in April 2010 ,prior to the enforcement of the new Constitution. It would be contrary to the justice system and in fact the Constitution  to demand a  retrial of all  cases  based on  the  omission of a  right to representation as effectuated by Article 50(2) (h) of the current  Constitution. Every case is determined on its own merits and it would be a subjective test to determine if any prejudice would be occasioned as a result of this omission. In any event, the Respondent’s first trial took place under the old constitutional regime and as indicated before he would not have been entitled to free legal representation during his first trials. The Respondent’s prayer in regard to the same should for that reason be disallowed. It materializes that this line of reasoning is still unfailing as read with Article 7(1) (c) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights which also provides that

'[e]very individual shall have the right to have his case heard. This comprises the right to defense, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice...’

The Court of Appeal in David Njoroge Macharia -v- Republic[28] discussed the issue of substantial injustice and concluded that the right to legal representation is not an automatic right and must be decided on merit and on a case by case basis.

Nothing in Article 94[29] of the Constitution suggests that legislative arm of government cannot pass a mandatory sentence for certain offences. The death penalty is acceptable to a majority of the Kenyan people and evidently justified by Article 109 (1), Article 1 (2) and Article 2 (3) of the Constitution. This is consequently consistent with the right to a fair trial. Further Article 133 (1) sets out an Advisory Committee on Prerogative of Mercy to advise the President on when to grant a pardon or to remit part of the sentence imposed. It is my humble request that this court does take judicial notice of the fact that the President on the advice of the committee on prerogative of mercy has previously commuted the death sentences of all death row convicts prior to 2009 ,to one of life imprisonment.[30]


 

c.       The Court of Appeal erred in finding that  Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya is inconsistent with and contrary to Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is binding on Kenya as from the date of ratification on 1st May 1972. This Article is in the following terms:

Article 6 (1) ‘[E]very human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.’

Article 6 (2) ‘[I]n countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court.’

Granted  international covenants such as Article 6(1) of the ICCPR, the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Recognizing Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Committee and the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Toward the Abolition of the Death Penalty are focused on encouraging  member  states to do away with the death penalty, or to reserve the penalty for the most serious crimes. Of course what each state regards as most serious crime is left for its discretion.

The Kenyan people through Article 26 (3) of the Constitution permit the death penalty though not expressly ‘to the extent authorized by this Constitution or other written law.’ The death penalty has legally been provided for in the Penal Code for the offence of robbery with violence, and this provision accords with the provisions of Article 26 (3). It is a general  consensus  that the law making authority under our Constitution is vested in  under Article 94 (1), in the National Assembly, and as also provided for in the same Constitution at Article 2 (2) which therefore requires this appellate court to exercises authority only ‘as authorized by this Constitution.’ It is consequently not the role of this Court to usurp the authority of the  legislature and  alter the express proviso which clearly makes  parliaments intention known. Section 297 (2)[31]uses the strongest words to make obvious parliaments intention  ‘shall be put to death’. This may be viewed as imposing on judges a mandatory obligation resulting in the passing of a death penalty if finding of guilt is entered.

It remains the constitutional mandate and province of the legislature to make any such amendments as it deems fit to any  law and in particular to the circumstances under which the death penalty should be imposed or limited  in cases of robbery with violence. It seems clear that the Kenyan courts do not arbitrarily pass the death penalty. It is in fact true that there are limited instances where the death penalty is provided for under the Penal Code as the mandatory form of punishment; all of the instances which qualify as reasonable due to the  gravity of the  offenses. It as a result can be seen that the punishment sanctioned by law is reasonable and is in reality a  justifiable means towards an end.


 

d.      The Court of Appeal erred in finding that  Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya is inconsistent with and contrary to Article 28 of the Constitution.

Article 28 reads as follows; ‘[e]very person has inherent dignity and the right to have that dignity respected and protected’. As previously stated above ,Article 25 of the Constitution lists the rights and freedoms  that may not be limited despite any other provision as provided in the Constitution and in any other law. It is curious to note that the right to inherent dignity is not qualified and as such means that the same can be deemed to be a limited right by virtue of Section 297 (2) of the penal code therefore not unconstitutional.

In Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe vs. Attorney General and Others[32], the supreme court agreed that the petitioners’ 5 years delay on the death row, in demeaning physical conditions, since the pronouncement of their sentences, went beyond what was constitutionally permissible. The delay caused prolonged mental suffering and was inordinate when compared with the average length of delay in carrying out execution in Zimbabwe. In addition, the privy council in Earl Pratt and Morgan vs. Attorney General of Jamaica and others[33] stated that for Jamaica where there is only one appeal step, a protracted appeal process beyond two years was tending towards unreasonable delay. If there was inordinate delay in executing the sentence of death, the condemned prisoners, had the right to come to court to examine whether, owing to the delay, the sentence of death should be carried out. It is my considered view that this ground for determination is premature as can be distinguished from the above case where warrants for the petitioners’ execution had already been issued. In the case at hand, no such a warrant has been issued yet and it can therefore be concluded that the Respondent’s right to human dignity still persists. The Appellate reaffirms its commitment towards the progressive realization of the establishment of an official moratorium on executions, in line with United Nations General Assembly resolutions[34] and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights resolution calling on state parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights to observe the moratorium on the death penalty.[35]

Section 15(1) of the Zimbabwean Constitution is in pari materia with Article 28 of our constitution. Condemned prisoners do not lose all their constitutional rights and freedoms, except those rights and freedoms that have inevitably been removed from them by law, either expressly or by necessary implication. The Court of Appeal in Uganda in Susan Kigula & 416 others[36]stated in its judgment that the death sentence is recognized under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of Uganda and is therefore constitutional. The court went on further to state that the condemned prisoners are still entitled to the protection of Articles 24 and 44(a) of the Constitution in respect of their treatment while they are in confinement before execution.

In conclusion therefore it is my submission that Section 297 (2) is consistent with Article 28 of the Constitution in so far as the warrant for the Respondent’s execution has not already been issued. In any event, the right is derogatable in the necessary instance of effectuating an execution of a court order duly passed.


 

CONCLUSION

This court is empowered by the Criminal Procedure Act Chapter 21,order 42 rule 32 to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made or make such further or other decree as this particular case may require. This power may be  exercised in favor of either of the parties to the suit.

In lieu  of the forgoing ,the Appellate humbly prays the following before this honorable court:

(i)     A declaration that the Court of Appeal erred in finding that Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya is inconsistent with and contrary to Articles 24 (1); 24 (2) (c) and 26 (1) (3) of the Constitution of Kenya; and an  affirmative declaration to that the death penalty is Constitutional.

(ii)   A declaration that the Court of Appeal erred in finding that  Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya is inconsistent with and contrary to Articles 29 (f) and 25 (a) (c) of the Constitution of Kenya and Articles 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and a further pronouncement that the right to life is qualified under the Constitution of Kenya.

(iii) A declaration that the Court of Appeal erred in finding that  Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya is inconsistent with and contrary to Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and that a prescribed mandatory sentence does not infringe upon the doctrine of separation of powers.

(iv) A declaration that the Court of Appeal erred in finding that  Section 297 (2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya is inconsistent with and contrary to Article 28 of the Constitution and a supplementary declaration that this right is to be view in light of the  continuous  constitutional interpretation of the Kenyan Constitution.

 

 

 

 



[1] ICCPR
[2] Ibid
[3] Civil Procedure Act  Chapter 21 Section 72
[4] And now impliedly to the Supreme Court.
[5] Causation in fact issues will therefore not be tackled in this brief.
[6] [1984] KLR 611.
 
[7] Supreme Court is the court of last resort
[8]  Sec 297 (2) Chapter 63,Laws of Kenya
[9] Ibid
[10] Ibid
[11] Jurisdiction to determine the question whether a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights has been denied,violated,infringed or threatened;
[12] Section 297(2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 63, and Laws of Kenya
[13] …appellate jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from-
(i)       The Court of Appeal…
[14] Appeals shall lie from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court-
a)       As of right in any case involving the interpretation or application of this Constitution…
 
[15] Chapter 4-The Bill of Rights; Part 2
[16] Chapter 8 Laws of Kenya
[17] ICCPR
[18] adopted in December1989 and came into effect in July 1991
[19] Kenya notably refused to vote for a UN resolution calling for the abolition of the death penalty during the 58th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights.
[20] [2010] eKLR
[21] Penal Code  Chapter 63 Laws of Kenya
[22] 13 NIUL R54
[23] Resolution 3542 (XXX)
[24] 3 1995 TLR 97
[25] Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Africa Cct/3/94
 
[26] 1lrc, 216 
[27] [2013] eKLR Constitutional Petition 318 of 2011  
[28] Criminal  Appeal No. 497 of 2007[2011] eKLR
[29] Chapter 8 The legislature
[30] In August 2009, the Kenyan government announced that more than 4,000 prisoners sentenced to death (all prisoners then on death row) would have their sentences commuted to terms of imprisonment.
[31] Penal code Chapter 63 Laws of Kenya
[32] (1993) 2LRC 279)
[33] (case No 27 vol 3) No 210 of 1986 and 225 of 1987
[34] 62/149 and 63/168
[35] (ACHPR/Res.136(XXXXIIII).08)Constitutional Petition No 6 of 2003
[36] Constitutional Petition No 6 of 2003